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The dark side of strengthening minority shareholder voting power: an innovation perspective
发布时间 2019-11-23 21:34:51    来源:本站  点击次数

江西财经大学金融学院蛟湖金融论坛2019年第20  期(总第 87  期)



目:The dark side of strengthening minority shareholder voting power: an innovation perspective

时    间:1129日(周五)上午10:00

地    点:金融学院二楼东头报告厅

报告人:安云碧 教授



报告人简介:


安云碧教授是加拿大皇后大学金融学博士,现任加拿大温莎大学Odette商学院金融学教授,其主要研究领域包括公司财务金融、资产组合选择与资产组合保险、风险管理等。曾在Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, Financial Management, Journal of International Money and Finance, Small Business EconomicsJournal of Futures Markets等国际期刊发表论文三十余篇。安教授的学术成果得到了国内外金融理论与实务界的广泛承认,多次受邀参加EFMA, EFA, MFA, 以及NFA等举办的金融学年会,并担任许多国际著名期刊的审稿专家。


Abstract:

Based on the regulatory reforms designed to strengthen the protection of legitimate rights and interests of minority investors in 2014 in China, we investigate minority shareholders’ short-termism and the dark side of strengthened minority voting power after the reforms. We find that strengthened minority voting power negatively impacts innovation outputs as measured by both invention patent and utility model patent counts. We show that the reduced innovation outcomes cannot be explained by the weakened monitoring from major shareholders associated with high ownership dispersion. Moreover, strengthened minority voting power helps enhance the vesting target earnings growth rate in executive incentive plans and top executive turnover-performance sensitivity, which in turn undermine innovation. Finally, the negative impact of minority voting power on innovation is particularly pronounced for firms with non-entrenched managers, a lower average percentage of equity ownership, and a lower percentage of ownership by pressure resistant institutions.